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The NCAA's Regulations
Related to the Use of Agents in
the Sport of Baseball:
Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the
Amateur Athlete?
By Richard T. Karcher*
When one considers what a sports
agent does, he or she often recalls the movie
Jerry Maguire, in which Tom Cruise hustles
prospective clients and does whatever it takes
to keep or acquire a client, even if it means
















visions, an amateur athlete is prohibited from
retaining anyone, including a competent law-
yer or agent, to represent him or her in the
negotiation of a professional sports contract.
This is otherwise known as the "no agent
rule." According to the NCAA, these regula-
tions are necessary to promote and ensure
"Sports agents have gained
the reputation of corrupt and
"unscrupulous" actors who
take advantage of amateur
and professional athletes..."
of amateur and professional
athletes in favor of their own proprietary self-
interest. Much of this negative sentiment
stems from highly publicized cases involving
sports agents engaged in illegal conduct.'
The crimes committed by a few "bad
apples" prompted the enactment of numer-
ous, comprehensive state statutes and govern-
ing rules established by professional sports
players unions and collegiate athletic govern-
ing bodies.2 For example, the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (NCAA) has enacted
a strict set of bylaws regulating the use of
agents by amateur athletes. Among these pro-
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.3
When looking at these regulations, the
unavoidable question arises: who is the NCAA
trying to protect? If the NCAA seeks to pro-
tect the amateur athlete, it would seemingly
be in the athlete's best interest to have com-
petent representation to deal with professional
sports organizations and the complex business
and legal issues that surround the world of
professional sports. Protecting the athlete
from corrupt, unscrupulous sports agents is
an understandable and noble objective. But
even if the NCAA regulations play a role in
deterring corrupt and unscrupulous conduct
SPORTS
on the part of agents (a notion that is highly
suspect), the rules are detrimental to the ath-
lete if he is precluded from retaining a compe-
tent agent or lawyer to advocate on his behalf.4
First, this Article will discuss the NCAA
regulations applicable to all sports regarding the
use of agents by amateur athletes. Next, this
Article will discuss (i) the mechanics of the an-
nual Major League Baseball draft, (ii) the fac-
tors that contribute to the necessity and desire
for amateur baseball players to retain a compe-
tent agent or lawyer before they have extin-
guished their NCAA eligibility, and (iii) how the
NCAA regulations are detrimental to both
drafted and draft-eligible amateur baseball play-
ers. Finally, this Article will discuss how the
NCAA should revise its regulations to better
serve the amateur athlete in the sport of base-
ball without destroying the distinction between
amateur and professional sports.
I. The NCAA Regulations Regard-
ing Use of Agents
Section 12.3 of Article 12 (Amateurism)
of the NCAA Bylaws governs the use of agents.
The guiding principle of Article 12 is that only
amateur student-athletes are eligible for partici-
pation in intercollegiate athletics.5 According
to the NCAA, "[m]ember institutions' athletics
programs are designed to be an integral part of
the educational program [and] [tihe student-
athlete is considered an integral part of the stu-
dent body, thus maintaining a clear line of de-
marcation between collegiate athletics and pro-
fessional sports."6 The NCAA regulations also
indicate that "an amateur student-athlete is one
who engages in a particular sport for the edu-
cational, physical, mental and social benefits de-
rived therefrom, and for whom participation
in that sport is an avocation."7
A. Agreements with Agents
The NCAA regulations prohibit amateur
athletes from agreeing to representation by an
agent. Bylaw 12.3.1, often referred to as the
"no agent rule," states that "[a]n individual shall
be ineligible for participation in an intercolle-
giate sport if he or she has agreed (orally or in
writing) to be represented by an agent for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics abil-
ity or reputation in that sport."' 8 Furthermore,
the agency agreement is applicable to all sports
unless the contract specifically states that it only
applies to a particular sport or sports.9 Thus,
an athlete who agrees to representation by an
agent is ineligible to participate in any sport at
any NCAA institution. ° However, if the ath-
lete and the agent limit their agreement to a
particular sport or sports, then the athlete
would be ineligible to participate only in such
sport or sports.1
The prohibition set forth in Bylaw 12.3.1
is not limited to agreements with respect to pro-
fessional sports negotiations by an agent on be-
half of an athlete that take place while the ath-
lete is enrolled at the institution or has eligibil-
ity remaining in that sport. An athlete shall also
be ineligible if he or she agrees that the agent
will represent him or her in negotiations with
professional sports teams that are to take place
subsequent to the athlete's completion of eligi-
bility in that sport.
12
It is important to note that the NCAA
regulations prohibiting amateur athletes from
agreeing to representation by an agent apply
not only to collegiate athletes already enrolled
in NCAA institutions, but also to high school
students or graduates prior to collegiate enroll-
ment.' 3 Thus, even high school students may
be declared ineligible to participate in collegiate
sports by the NCAA before they even sign a
scholarship or Letter of Intent to attend an
NCAA institution.
B. Benefits from Prospective
Agents
The NCAA has instituted strict regula-
tions with respect to amateur athletes receiv-
ing any benefits, financial or otherwise, from
agents. The regulations even prohibit the
athlete's friends or relatives from accepting such
benefits. NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2, also known as
the "no benefits rule," provides as follows:
An individual shall be ineligible per By-
law 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or her rela-
tives or friends) accepts transportation
or other benefits from:
(a) Any person who represents
any individual in the marketing
of his or her athletics ability. The
receipt of such expenses consti-
tutes compensation based on
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athletics skill and is an extra ben-
efit not available to the student
body in general; or
(b) An agent, even if the agent
has indicated that he or she has
no interest in representing the
student-athlete in the marketing
of his or her athletics ability or
reputation and does not repre-
sent individuals in the student-
athlete's sport. 4
These regulations apply to the receipt of ben-
efits by any "individual." They apply not only
to collegiate athletes already enrolled in NCAA
institutions, but they also apply to high school
students or graduates prior to enrollment.1
5
For example, an amateur athlete's accep-
tance of automobile transportation from the
athlete's campus to a prospective agent's office
to discuss services the agent could provide to
the athlete upon signing a professional contract
is an improper. 6 In addition, a football agent
cannot provide transportation to a friend of a
member of the
local Division I "The crimes
college's base- 'bad
ball team. 7 If
an agent pro- enactment
vides advice to
an amateur ath- comprehensiv
lete about a pro- governing rL
fessional sports
contract, with professional sp
the understand-
ing that the ath- collegiate athE
lete would pay
the agent for such services after the athlete has
been drafted, regardless of the fact that the
agent has the same fee arrangement for all ama-
teur-athlete clients, that too would be an im-
proper benefit according to the NCAA.'
8
C. Use of Lawyers and Other
Advisors
The NCAA regulations permit an ama-
teur athlete to retain a lawyer for consultation
and advice concerning a proposed professional
sports contract.' 9 However, the lawyer, like an
agent, may not represent the athlete in nego-
tiations for such a contract.20 The regulations
even prohibit a lawyer from being present dur-
ing discussions of a contract offer between an
athlete and a professional sports organization
or making any contact with a professional or-
ganization on behalf of the athlete.2' Accord-
ing to the NCAA, "[a] lawyer's presence dur-
ing such discussions is considered representa-
tion by an agent." 22 Similar to the regulations
regarding entering agreements with agents and
receiving benefits, these rules also apply to high
school players prior to college enrollment.
23
In 1974, the members of the NCAA de-
termined that student-athletes might need le-
gal advice to assist them in evaluating and un-
derstanding a professional sports contract of-
fered while they still had collegiate sports eligi-
bility remaining. 24 The NCAA decided that,
during consideration of such a proposal, a stu-
dent-athlete "may seek the advice of a lawyer
relative to future negotiations or discussion of
the individual's professional aspirations, so long
as the lawyer does not become actively involved
in negotiations with the professional team or
organization. ' 25 According to the NCAA, "once
the student decides to have legal counsel con-
committed by a few
have prompted the
of numerous and
ye state statutes and
Iles established by
orts players unions and
etic governing bodies."
tact the professional club concerning the contract
offer, the individual has agreed to be represented
by an agent in the marketing of his or her athlet-
ics talent, and no longer is eligible per 12.3.2.
' 26
Interestingly, the NCAA makes no dis-
tinction between lawyers and non-lawyers in
terms of giving consultation and advice to the
athlete. According to the NCAA, Bylaw 12.3.2
"was not intended to restrict individuals other
than lawyers (e.g., financial consultants, family
friends) from giving advice regarding profes-
sional contracts." 27 Thus, any third party is per-
mitted to advise the athlete provided that the
"advisor" does not represent the athlete in ne-
gotiations for such a contract.
28
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D. Professional Sports Coun-
seling Panel and Head Coach
Exception
Section 12.3.4 of the NCAA Bylaws per-












with a professional sports organization on be-
half of the student-athlete.3"
The panel consists of at least three per-
sons appointed by the institution's chief execu-
tive officer.31 Not more than one person on the
panel may be a member of the athletic depart-
"...high school students may be
declared ineligible to participate in
collegiate sports by the NCAA
before they have even signed a
scholarship or Letter of Intent to
attend an NCAA institution"
(a) Advise
a student-athlete about a future profes-
sional career;
(b) Provide direction on securing a
loan for the purpose of purchasing in-
surance against a disabling injury;
(c) Review a proposed professional
sports contract;
(d) Meet with the student-athlete
and representatives of professional
teams;
(e) Communicate directly (e.g., in-
person, by mail or telephone) with
representatives of a professional athlet-
ics team to assist in securing a tryout
with that team for a student-athlete;
(f) Assist the student-athlete in the
selection of an agent by participating
with the student-athlete in interviews of
agents, by reviewing written informa-
tion player agents send to the student-
athlete, and by having direct commu-
nication with those individuals who can
comment about the abilities of an agent
(e.g., other agents, a professional
league's players' association); and
Visit with player agents or representa-
tives of professional athletics teams to
assist the student-athlete in determin-
ing his or her market value (e.g., poten-
tial salary, draft status).2 9
Although it is not expressly stated, the NCAA
also permits the panel to negotiate a contract
ment staff; all others on the panel must be mem-
bers of the institution's full-time staff.32 Finally,
no institutional staff member who is also an
agent may participate as a member on the
panel.
33
The legislative intent behind Bylaw
12.3.4, adopted in 1984, is worth noting:
This legislation was intended to
encourage member institutions
to provide guidance to their stu-
dent-athletes regarding future
athletic professional careers.
While legislation previously was
adopted to permit institutions to
offer career counseling in all ar-
eas, in 1984 the membership
believed that student-athletes'
involvement with professional
athletics warranted special atten-
tion. While this focus on pro-
fessional athletics is essential, it
should not detract from an
institution's role in providing
guidance to student-athletes in
career counseling generally.
Further, this legislation was in-
tended to assist student-athletes
in making a decision regarding
whether to remain in school or
turn professional and providing
guidance to student-athletes re-
garding contracts and agree-
Spring 2005
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ments with player agents. Ad-
ditionally, a panel should provide
to the student-athlete a realistic
appraisal of his or her potential
for becoming a successful pro-
fessional athlete. It is important
that the student-athlete receive
objective advice from individu-
als at institutions who have no
vested interest in the student-
athlete's career. Essentially, a
panel should attempt to provide
information to the student-ath-
lete regarding professional ath-
letics that he or she may not be
able to obtain or understand suf-
ficiently himself or herself.
34
Unlike the regulations previously dis-
cussed in this Article pertaining to (i) agree-
ments with agents, (ii) the use of lawyers and
other advisors, and (iii) the receipt of benefits,
the bylaw provisions regarding sports counsel-
ing panels only apply to collegiate athletes en-
rolled in NCAA member institutions.35 There-
fore, high school players who have been
drafted, or anticipate being drafted, are prohib-
ited under the NCAA Bylaws from receiving
any assistance in contacting professional teams
to secure a tryout, determining their market
value, or negotiating a contract with a profes-
sional sports organization.
The student-athlete's head coach at the
NCAA member institution may contact agents
to assist the athlete in selecting an agent and
determining his or her market value.3 6 The
coach may also contact professional sports or-
ganizations on behalf of the athlete to secure
tryouts and to assist the student-athlete in de-
termining his or her market value.37 The coach
is not permitted, however, to receive compen-
sation for such services.3 8 If the head coach
partakes in these activities, he or she is then
required to consult with and report his or her
activities to the institution's professional sports
counseling panel; if the institution does not have
such a panel, then the coach is to report to the
institution's chief executive officer.
39
E. Draft Inquiry and Negotia-
tions Without An Agent
The NCAA Bylaws permit amateur ath-
letes to interact with professional sports teams
on their own without the use of an agent. For
example, an amateur athlete is permitted, both
before and after college enrollment, to ask a
professional sports organization for information
concerning his or her eligibility for the draft or
individual market value.4° The athlete and his
legal guardians are also permitted to negotiate
a contract with a professional sports organiza-
tion.
41
However, an amateur athlete loses eligi-
bility if he or she asks, subsequent to initial full-
time collegiate enrollment, to be placed on the
draft list or supplemental draft list of a profes-
sional sports league even if (i) the athlete asks
to have his or her name be withdrawn from
the draft list prior to the actual draft, (ii) the
athlete's name remains on the draft list but he
or she is not drafted, or (iii) the athlete is drafted
but does not sign an agreement with any pro-
fessional sports team.42 This NCAA regulation
is often referred to as the "no draft rule." The
only exception to the rule is for an enrolled stu-
dent-athlete who plays basketball; he or she
may enter his or her name on the draft list one
time without jeopardizing his eligibility, pro-
vided that the student-athlete is not drafted by
any team and that he or she subsequently de-
clares an intention in writing to resume inter-
collegiate participation within 30 days after the
draft.
4
III. Application of the NCAA Regu-
lations in Baseball
A. The Major League Base-
ball Amateur Draft
In June of each year, Major League Base-
ball conducts its amateur draft, known as the
First-Year Player Draft." In general, players
who are eligible to be drafted and sign a pro-
fessional contract are (i) graduating high school
seniors, (ii) college players who have completed
their junior year or who are at least 21 years old
within forty-five days of the draft, and (iii) jun-
ior college players.45 The team that drafts a
player has the exclusive right to negotiate a pro-
fessional contract with that player until the
player becomes a college player by entering or
returning to college.46 If a player instead
chooses to become a professional athlete, the
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signing bonus,
which must be
stated in a fixed dollar amount and paid to the
player before the end of the calendar year fol-
lowing the date of the contract, (ii) a provision
in which the player receives a payment of $2,500
contingent upon the player being retained by
the signing major or minor league club for a
period that may not exceed 90 days of the club's
playing season, (iii) a provision in which the
player receives standard "incentive bonus pay-
ments" contingent upon the player being on
the roster in a certain classification for 90 days
in any one season ($1,000 for the AA classifica-
tion, $1,500 for the AAA classification, and
$5,000 for the major league level), and (iv) the
amount to be paid to the player by the club for
attendance at a college of the player's choice
for tuition, room, board, books and fees pur-
suant to the college scholarship plan.48
B. The "Signability" Factor
In the days, weeks, and months leading
up to the draft each year, scouts from all thirty
clubs and the Major League Scouting Bureau
evaluate all of the draft-eligible amateur play-
ers throughout the United States, Canada, and
Puerto Rico. As part of the evaluation process,
scouts assess a player's skill, makeup, and char-
acter. In evaluating character attributes, scouts
begin to develop a personal relationship with
select players. Scouts even ask players to take
psychological exams and to answer a variety of
questions in order to assess character and per-
sonality traits.
Another important component to a
scout's evaluation is the player's "signability."
This term, widely used among scouts, players,
and agents, refers to the amount of money it
will cost a team to sign a particular player to a
professional contract if that player is drafted.
As one might expect, signability becomes more
of a factor with respect to high school seniors
and college juniors than with college seniors.
This is because younger players have the bar-
gaining leverage of returning to school in the
fall following the June draft instead of signing a
professional contract.
Due to the steady increase in signing
bonuses of drafted players over the past ten to
fifteen years, signability has become more and
more important to the clubs. The signing bo-
nuses of the players picked first in the baseball


















Ben McDonald - $350,000
Chipper Jones - $275,000
Brien Taylor - $1,550,000
Phil Nevin - $700,000
Alex Rodriguez - $1,000,000
Paul Wilson - $1,550,000
Darin Erstad - $1,600,000
Kris Benson - $2,000,000
Matt Anderson - $2,500,000
Pat Burrell - $3,150,000
Josh Hamilton - $3,960,000
Adrian Gonzalez - $3,000,000
Joe Mauer - $5,150,000
Bryan Bullington - $4,000,000
Delmon Young - $5,800,000 guaranteed
hat includes a $3,700,000 signing bonus
49
Matt Bush - $3,150,00050
It is important to note that a player's draft slot
is not necessarily indicative of the amount of a
signing bonus. For example, in the 2000 draft,
the twelfth pick in the draft received a signing
bonus in the amount of $5,300,00, which is
$2,300,000 more than the first pick that year.
5
1















"The NCAA has instituted
strict regulations with respect
to amateur athletes receiving
any benefits, financial or
otherwise, from agents"
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ceived $600,000 more than the first pick.52 In
the 2004 draft, third round draft pick Matt
Tuiasosopo, a high school player from
Woodinville, Washington, signed for
$2,290,000, the equivalent to the bonus that
players in the top half of the first round re-
ceived.53 Thus, it is easy to see how important
a player's signability is to the clubs at draft time.
In fact, a player's signability often de-
termines whether a particular club will even
consider drafting that player. Prior to the draft,
scouts attempt to determine as precisely as pos-
sible a player's signability through discussions
with the player and/or his representativem In-
deed, the Major League Rules expressly permit
club personnel to talk to any player, prior to
the draft, "at any time concerning a career in
professional baseball and discussing the merits
of the player's contracting, when eligible, with
any particular [c]lub."55
Thus, many clubs engage in "pre-draft
dealing" with certain players. In other words,
a scout or other front-office personnel engages
in negotiations with a player and/or his repre-
sentative prior to the draft. Essentially, the
player makes a commitment to the club that
he will sign for a certain amount of money if
that club drafts him.56 This arrangement can
be beneficial to the club and the player because
it brings certainty to both sides; thus, a con-
tract can be completed shortly after the draft
without the need for prolonged negotiations
throughout the summer.
5 7
The signing of Matt Bush, the number
one draft pick by the San Diego Padres out of a
local San Diego high school in 2004, involved a
pre-draft deal. Jim Callis from Baseball America
discussed the negotiations that took place be-
tween Padres general manager, Kevin Towers,
and the representatives of Matt Bush just days
before the draft:
The deal took four more phone calls, all
the Sunday morning before the draft
among Towers and Bush's advisors, Greg
Genske and Kenny Felder, both associ-
ates of longtime agent Jeff Moorad.
They went like this:
Call No. 1: Towers indi-
cates a willingness to spend be-
tween $2.5 million and $3 mil-
lion. Knowing Bush isn't the
true No. 1 talent, Genske wants
the $3.35 million No. 3 pick Kyle
Sleeth received last year. "I'm
not sure we can go much lower,"
Genske says.
Call No. 2: An hour later,
Towers calls back and says he
probably can't go over 3. Al-
though no Padres deal would
slide Bush to at best the Devil
Rays at No. 4 or, more likely, the
Nos. 7-12 range (meaning just a
$2 million bonus and no home-
town team), Genske still comes
down to only $3.25 million.
Towers says, "He's from San Di-
ego. You want to go to Tampa
Bay? Or later? We're very pre-
pared to roll the dice and take
[Stephen] Drew."
Call No. 3: Towers in-
forms Genske, "3.1 is our final
offer, or we're walking." Genske
counters with 3.15. Towers tells
[scouting director, Bill] Gayton,
"We could stay at 3, and the kid
will call back and take the 3."
F"the NCAA makes no
distinction between lawyers and
non-lawyers in terms of giving
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process has become "big business." In addi-
tion to employing a staff of full- and part-time
scouts, clubs hire statisticians to analyze player
performance and lawyers to monitor compli-
ance with the Major League Rules and negoti-
ate player contracts. To level the playing field,
it is common practice for amateur baseball play-
ers to retain agents to assist them with the busi-
ness aspects of the draft process, which often
results in the representative having contact with
professional clubs in violation of the NCAA
regulations.
5 9
C. The Regulations' Effect on
Players
Violations of the NCAA Bylaws by ama-
teur athletes can have severe consequences for
the athlete and his institution. When the ath-
lete becomes ineligible for competition due to
a violation, the member institution can be
forced to retroactively forfeit games.60 Also, in-
eligibility can lead to further NCAA investiga-
tions, self-imposed probations, NCAA-imposed
suspensions, or even program termination.61 In
essence, the NCAA has discretion to impose
any sanctions it deems appropriate.




on their own withoi
of an agent:'
ercised that discretion. Before his freshman
year at Vanderbilt, Jeremy Sowers and his fam-
ily retained an advisor regarding a proposed
contract after he was drafted in the first round
(2 0th pick) by the Cincinnati Reds. The advisor
had contact with one or more representatives
of the Reds organization.62 Sowers could not
reach an agreement with the Reds; he enrolled
at Vanderbilt in the fall of 2001. The NCAA
reprimanded Sowers with a six-game suspen-
sion for violating the no agent rule.63 This re-
sult is disturbing in light of the fact that Sow-
ers retained a competent agent to represent him
and advocate on his behalf in his best interest.
Sowers did not receive any improper benefits
from the agent, nor did the agent engage in any
corrupt or unlawful behavior.64
Sowers, like any draft-eligible baseball
player, is susceptible to violating NCAA rules
due to the timing of the draft and the Major
League Baseball draft-eligibility rules. The draft
takes place at the end, or shortly after the end,
of the high school and collegiate baseball regu-
lar seasons. Thus, draft-eligible baseball play-
ers do not have time to interview prospective
agents, to make an informed decision as to who
they want to represent them, and to have their
representative contact professional clubs on
their behalf to assess market value and deter-
mine which clubs are most interested. It is,
therefore, in the best interest of an amateur
baseball player to retain an agent before the
season starts.65
Baseball is significantly different from
other draft sports, such as football. Under the
National Football League (NFL) rules, amateur
football players are not draft-eligible until the
completion of their senior year in college un-
less, upon completion of their junior football
season, they ask
to be placed on




rts teams are not eligible
for the NFL
it the use draft. As a re-




a professional contract or to enroll in college
after being drafted. As for college football play-
ers, their season ends in the end of November
or early December unless their team attends a
bowl game, in which case the season would end
in the first week of January at the latest. There-
fore, college seniors, as well as college juniors
who have declared draft eligibility, have three
to four months between the end of the season
and the NFL draft in April in which to select an
agent and have their representative contact pro-
fessional clubs on their behalf in preparation
Spring 2005
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"...an amateur athlete loses
eligibility if he or she asks,
subsequent to initial full-time
collegiate enrollment, to be placed
on the draft list or supplemental
draft list of a professional sports
.league..:'
for the draft.66
After the completion of the season,
draft-eligible football players choose an agent
and execute a standard representation agree-
ment with the agent issued by the NFL Players
Association.6 7  Once the player either com-
pletes his senior football season or declares him-
self draft-eligible after his junior season, he has
exhausted his remaining NCAA eligibility in that
sport. At that point, the player is not concerned
about violating the NCAA's prohibition against
entering agreements with agents. In contrast,
draft-eligible baseball players are obviously con-
cerned about NCAA compliance because they
have remaining NCAA eligibility both before
and after the draft.
68
IV. Revisiting the Regulations: Two
Recommendations
A. Permit Players to Retain
Agents under the Supervi-
sion of the Member Institu-
tion
As succinctly stated by one commenta-
tor: "The NCAA's general rule on student-ath-
lete contact with a sports agent is clear: A stu-
dent-athlete risks losing his or her intercolle-
giate athletics eligibility by doing anything more
than talking with an agent. ' 69 The current
NCAA regulations make no distinction between
permissible and impermissible conduct on the
part of agents. This is because the NCAA has
no standing to discipline the agents since agents
are not members of the NCAA.7° Instead, the
NCAA makes the pertinent distinction between
an advisor who deals one-on-one with the stu-
dent-athlete (which is permissible) and an ad-













yer or agent to negotiate a contract to the maxi-
mum benefit of the student-athlete; however,
they permit an amateur athlete to seek advice
from a lawyer about a standard player contract
and to negotiate a professional contract with
the aid of a member institution's professional
sports counseling panel.
According to the NCAA, these rules are
necessary to maintain "a clear line of demarca-
tion between collegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports." The NCAA's objective, however,
is accomplished with the regulation that an
amateur athlete is ineligible to compete in a
collegiate sport once he or she signs a profes-
sional contract in that sport. Simply permit-
ting a student-athlete to retain competent rep-
resentation to contact professional clubs and to
advocate on his behalf to obtain a result that is
in his own best interests, financially and other-
wise, would not destroy the line of demarca-
tion any more than allowing the student-ath-
lete or the professional sports counseling panel
to engage in the same conduct.
Prior to the annual baseball amateur
draft, it is clearly in the player's best interest,
due in large part to the signability issue and
pre-draft dealing, for him to (i) accurately as-
sess his market value, (ii) evaluate the pros and
cons to signing a professional contract after his
senior year in high school or junior year in col-
lege (as the case may be), (iii) determine for how
much he is willing to sign a professional con-
tract and properly convey this information to
the clubs, and (iv) learn about the Major League
Baseball rules and regulations. Further, once
the player is drafted, there is no compelling rea-
son to deny a player the opportunity to obtain
maximum value for his services, even if that
requires retaining an experienced agent to ne-
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gotiate with the club. In the NCAA's view, the
student-athlete or the institution's professional
sports counseling panel is best qualified to
handle all of these pre- and post-draft respon-
sibilities. 1 This perspective is flawed in numer-
ous respects.
First, the player is clearly not the appro-
priate person to be handling these responsibili-
ties. The amateur athlete is not experienced in
the business aspects of major league baseball
to adequately assess his market value or to ef-
fectively negotiate a professional contract. He
should not be given these responsibilities to
maintain in addition to his responsibilities in
the classroom and on the field. Second, players
graduating from high school are not going to
have access to professional sports counseling
panels at NCAA member institutions. In ef-
fect, the panels are only available to draft-eli-
gible college players. Since it is not mandatory
that NCAA member institutions establish a pro-
fessional sports counseling panel, many colleges
and universities do not even offer such a ser-
vice to their student-athletes. With respect to
institutions that do have a panel for the benefit
of its student-athletes, it is questionable as to
whether the members of that panel are quali-
fied to adequately serve the best interests of the
athlete.
Using Villanova University's panel as an
example, the Associate Dean of Administration,
the Associate Athletic Director, the university's
General Counsel, and the chairperson of the De-
partment of Education and Human Services are
probably not experienced in baseball talent
evaluation or knowledgeable enough about the
Major League Baseball rules and regulations.
Furthermore, they probably do not have rela-
tionships with scouts and front-office person-
nel. Indeed, these individuals have full-time
jobs with major responsibilities at the univer-
sity and likely cannot devote the necessary time
and effort to such details on behalf of the player.
In addition, there is an inherent conflict of in-
terest when representatives of the university
advise its players whether to sign a professional
contract-the school may have an interest in
having its players play for the school another
year instead of becoming a professional.72
Student-athletes in every major colle-
giate sport who are professional prospects are
going to retain a representative experienced and
knowledgeable in their particular sport to as-
sist them in obtaining maximum draft status,
and rightfully so. However, with respect to
baseball players, the NCAA regulations create
an incentive for a player to engage in the agent
selection process in isolation, apart from the
assistance of the member institution and coach-
ing staff, for fear that the player might lose eli-
gibility or that he or the member institution
might be reprimanded. "Unscrupulous" agents
thrive in this type of environment.
The NCAA needs to recognize the prob-
lems caused by the timing of the baseball draft
and the Major League Baseball rules pertaining
to draft-eligibility, and make an exception for
student-athletes in the sport of baseball to re-
tain agents. If such an exception is made and
the fear of NCAA reprimand is removed, more
college coaches and member institutions would
be inclined to provide assistance to student-ath-
letes in the selection of an agent.73 The role of
the professional sports counseling panel would
then be limited to the evaluating potential
agents who are interested in representing the
player and assisting the player in the selection
of a competent representative. Keeping the "no
benefits" rule intact would help maintain the
integrity of the agent selection process and en-




The NCAA should also require the stu-
dent-athlete to execute a standard representa-
tion agreement with his agent, similar to the
NFL Players Association standard agreement
between draft-eligible football players and their
agents. In addition to helping to maintain the
integrity of the agent selection process, this
would enable the NCAA to establish certain
terms and conditions governing the relation-
ship between the student-athlete and agent, in-
cluding the duties, responsibilities, and fees of
the agent. Such written agreements would be
beneficial to both the athlete and the agent be-
cause it would replace the "loose" understand-
ings that often result in disputes between the
parties with certainty. The student-athlete
would then be required to send a copy of the
executed representation agreement to the mem-
ber institution, where it would be kept on file
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for a certain period of time for future reference.
V. Conclusion
The NCAA regulations regarding use of
agents are not practical for the amateur base-
ball player. More specifically, the regulations
fail to consider the timing of the baseball draft
and the Major League Baseball rules regarding
draft eligibility. As a result of the huge increases
in signing bonuses over the last fifteen years, a
player's signability has become a significant fac-
tor in the draft process and pre-draft dealing
has become commonplace in the industry-all
of which amounts to "big business." There is
no compelling reason to prohibit a player from
retaining a competent agent to deal directly
with the clubs, both pre- and post-draft, to
maximize the player's draft potential and ob-
tain maximum value for his services. With the
assistance of the member institution and its
coaching staff in the agent selection process, as
well as standardizing player-agent representa-
tion agreements, the player is less likely to get
involved with an "unscrupulous" agent and the
line of demarcation between collegiate athlet-
ics and professional sports would remain un-
disturbed.
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